Abstract
Introduction
The effective management of human resources is a sine qua non condition for any organisation aiming for a mature and mutually respectful labour relationship with its staff. Effective human resource management is vital for the local state as it grapples with monumental development challenges, and whilst the exit of staff may create space for new blood, the old adage 'old broom knows all the corners' holds true. McCabe et al (2008) argue that executive turnover can have farreaching consequences on a local authority's development policies, programs and commitments. They analysed turnover patterns of council executives in large American councils to distinguish 'push' and 'pull' factors that induce council managers to leave their jobs, and concluded that political conflict and economic development can influence the likelihood that a council manager will leave. Grindle (1997) examined how staff were educated and attracted to public sector careers, and the utilisation and retention of individuals in the public sector, focussing on managerial, professional and technical staff and the extent to which career trajectories affect overall performance. This paper adopts a similar approach, examining managerial employees in Zimbabwe's Rural District Councils (RDCs) as key actors responsible for development in rural constituencies.
Why are these described as nebulous labour relations?
To set the context, we need to unpack the concepts -'nebulous' and 'labour relations'. The Concise Oxford Dictionary (2000) describes 'nebulous' as hazy, vague, indistinct, confused, cloudy or cloudlike. Trebilcock (1998) defines the term 'labour relations' (also known as industrial relations) as the system in which employers, workers and their representatives and the government, interact to set the ground rules for the governance of work relationships. The concept also describes a field of study dedicated to examining such relationships. Trebilcock (1998) further contends that the phrase 'labour relations' can also encompass individual employment relationships between an employer and a worker under a written or implied contract of employment.
Based on the author's twelve years of experience in Rural District Councils (RDCs) and the intense research and ensuing analysis, this paper argues that labour relations in Zimbabwe's RDCs were nebulous. As the winds of change blow over Zimbabwe in the post-crisis era (2009), it is our fervent hope that lessons learnt will be useful as the country embraces change and the much-sought administrative effectiveness.
The paper does not claim to be exhaustive on labour relations but is a modest contribution to the gaps and growing literature on labour relations in local government, public administration and cognate disciplines. This paper will provide institutional memory and add to knowledge or change prior beliefs. Indeed, there is a possibility of making a contribution that solidifies knowledge as Zimbabwe finds its feet in the post-crisis era.
McCabe et al (2008) argue that turnover in top administrative positions has been linked to management difficulties in public, private, and non-profit organizations, and that in the private sector, a great deal of research indicates that turnover has critical effects on an organization's performance and remaining personnel. It is thus axiomatic that executive turnover should also prove important in the public sector. At the local government level, turnover disrupts the relationship structures on which local governance depends. Council manager turnover is especially important because leaders play increasingly complex and interrelated roles in both the substance and the process of local governance. McCabe et al (2008) further posit that turnover among managers is often attributed to 'push' or 'pull' factors. Push factors prompt managers to leave their current positions because of political conflict or differences in style, orientation, or policy between the managers and their councils. Pull factors entice managers to leave their current positions for professional, financial, or personal advancement. McCabe et al (2008) 
Methodology
There are sixty RDCs in Zimbabwe, and to study the whole population was impractical, so the study 
Historical Overview
Zimbabwe has been through a very rough political and economic patch in what has been dubbed the 'Zimbabwe crisis' 1999 to 2009. The Zimbabwean political landscape has considerably shifted from a one-party system to a plural one, where the Movement for Democratic Change is part of the government machinery. The Minister of Local Government has acknowledged this plurality for the benefit of all. Mutizwa-Mangiza (1991) and Mandiyanike (2006) contend that until independence in 1 This paper draws from my doctoral research that examined critically the performance of rural local authorities in Zimbabwe over a period of ten years (from 1993 to 2003) . The performance of local authorities had been progressively declining. Money, equipment and other resources were made available through the Rural District Council Capacity Building Program (RDCCBP) and other donor-funded programs to salvage the RDCs, but the downward trend still persisted. I was thus questioning whether there was any 'capacity building' or 'capacity erosion'? Was there a willingness to build lasting capacity or it was being driven by donor conditionality? 2 The councils were suspended from office by the Ministry of Local Government. The 'progressive' ones were also appraised by the same ministry. (Mandiyanike 2006; Matyszak, 2010) . The transition to the new dispensation was fraught with resistance from the respective contenders and haggling among members of staff. The five-year delay in effecting the provisions of the RDC Act was, among other explanations, testimony to the complexity of the exercise that sought to unify two very different institutions at different levels of sophistication that were intended from inception for different purposes (Mandiyanike 2006; 2009a) . The paper will set in context by examining preindependence labour relations and the scene after 1990. 4 The paper will also explore the first RDC labour test case, whose interpretation had far-reaching implications for all RDCs as they dealt with labour issues.
Pre-independence and Pre-ESAP Labour Relations
In pre-independent Zimbabwe, the Industrial Conciliation Act 1934 guided labour relations from the 1930s. Lloyd (1993) argued that soon after independence in 1980, the government brought about several changes to the law, among them, the Employment Act 1980 which took away an employer's right to dismiss employees at will.
However shortly afterwards, the government turned its attention to providing an entirely new Act to govern labour relations and in December 1985, the Labour Relations Act 1985 (now Labour Act
Chapter 28:01) came into operation. Lloyd (1993) argued that the Labour Relations Act caused quite a stir, especially among employers, who saw it being weighted in favour of the employee. The government's position (then) can be explained in terms of its Marxist-Leninist leanings. In the period 1980-1989 central government assumed control of the termination of employment, for disciplinary reasons 5 and ensured that this could be affected through the Ministry of Labour. However, with the global political-economic trends, the government's position changed. Lloyd (1993) conceded that in 1989 the government began to loosen its grip on labour relations and promulgated regulations that encouraged more employer-employee interaction. Nabaho (2012) proposes three types of personnel systems for managing providers of decentralized services: an integrated personnel system, a unified personnel system and a separate personnel system.
Personnel Systems in General
In an integrated personnel system, local government is composed of central government civil servants, with central and local government personnel forming part of the same service, with transfers possible between both tiers. The system implies 'deconcentration' rather than 'devolution' of the civil service. Nabaho (2012) argues that one of the noticeable features of the integrated personnel system is that a dichotomy between central and local government cadres is non-existent. Central government appoints and posts officers to local authorities to meet service delivery needs from the central pool.
In a separate personnel system, each local government acts as a completely autonomous employer (Mawhood 1993; Nabaho 2012) . In principle, each local government appoints and administers personnel who are not transferable to another jurisdiction. Nabaho (2012) asserts that the separate personnel framework is preferred under decentralization by devolution because:
(a) It keeps the employees' loyalty unidirectional, ie: to the local government that has the right to hire and fire;
(b) Staff appointed locally gives quicker feedback since they are appointed to meet their employer's developmental needs, and proximity makes them more accountable to constituents through the elected local leadership. This is unlikely in integrated personnel systems where dual allegiance is common especially for senior officials.
In some cases, a separate personnel system does not always mean that terms and conditions of service house between the extremes of integrated and separate personnel arrangements and is a personnel model in which some or all categories of local government staff constitute follow a national career service (Nabaho 2012; Olowu 2001) . In unified personnel arrangements, local government staff are employed locally but organized nationwide into a single civil service parallel to the central one (Mawhood 1993) . In a typical unified system, all local government civil servants are members of a national 'local government civil service' but are only transferable between local governments.
In the case of Zimbabwe's RDCs, the separate personnel system is used. With a highly centralised government structure, the next section will discuss the involvement of government operatives within the RDCs' labour relations.
Post-1990 6 Labour Relations in RDCS
Until amalgamation in 1993, District Administrators (DAs) had been de jure CEOs for District Councils (Mandiyanike 2006; Hammar 2003) . The office of the DA falls directly under the Ministry of Local Government, and is totally separate from the RDC and increasingly plays a supervisory role.
After 1 July 1993, the nascent RDCs were expected to recruit their own CEOs and DAs would revert to their usual roles as representatives for central government policies representing the authority of Government within any given District.
Thus, in the pre-1989 era (as described above), RDC employees were generally taken to be employees of the state (civil servants). The District Administrator (DA) was the de jure Chief Executive Officer (CEO), and so conditions of service for RDC staff were almost equated to those of the staff at the DA's office. RDC employees were treated differently, and they were given lesser status than those working in the DA's office. Before amalgamation, councils received salary grants from the Ministry of Local Government and National Housing (MLGNH). Thus, the conditions of service were not debatable or subject to collective bargaining (a cardinal factor in labour relations), and recruitment and dismissal were subject to the approval of the Minister of Local Government. Because of their daily involvement, the DA 7 and his/her staff were able to exercise immense power, and councillors could not stand their ground against 'the minister's representative' (the DA who was also better educated and earned a high salary). The colonial imprint of the DA also had a bearing on this deference.
In this scenario, labour relations were very lopsided. However, many DAs had limited knowledge of labour relations and their advice to councils hinged very much on their (mis)application of Public Service Regulations to council staff. Council workers were considered as 'government employees' (civil servants) and could be fired willy-nilly or could become frustrated leading to resignation.
During day-to-day discussions, one could often hear reference to some unstated 'public service regulations', while in most cases there was very little contestation from employees because of the authoritarian nature of the regime.
Following amalgamation in 1993, DAs were no longer mandatory CEOs, salary grants had been significantly reduced, and RDCs could set their own salaries (although they tended to align them with 6 See footnote 4. 7 Mandiyanike (2006) In the above scenario, decision-makers tended to be guided by emotions rather than facts. alternative to the Minister of Labour). Apparently no change had been brought about in respect of RDCs (Lloyd, 1994 Oyugi (1993; p.129) argued that the power of an organisation to choose its own staff was an essential ingredient for decentralisation. It is unfortunate that through this 'veto power' that the Ministry of Local Government may exercise unfettered power that may create divided loyalties among staff. Mawhood (1993) observed that this 'divided loyalty' was rife in councils that did not get on well with the Ministry of Local Government. In my view, the senior officers often found themselves in awkward situations as they trod finely between the ministry and their council. This element of cronyism and victimisation inevitably led to job insecurity.
RDC Test Case
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Amidst this controversy, the following section attempts to explore what happened to CEOs a decade after amalgamation -to establish the rate of turnover. From the literature surveyed and cases examined, the paper concludes by arguing that labour relations in Zimbabwe's RDCs have been highly politicised and that Ministers of Local Government have fuelled the confusion and propagated unfair labour practices in the RDCs. This was further compounded by a murky legal framework. The next section will examine the recruitment and retention of the first CEOs after amalgamation and the controversy surrounding their employment.
12 Oyugi (1993; p.130) brought out very illuminating cases from Kenya on the abuse of the employing power. He argued that "a chairman would disagree with an officer (say the officer opposes illegality or malpractice). At once, he [chairman] begins to mobilise other councillors against that officer, thus, preparing him for dismissal. They may bring in their own cronies who may suffer the same fate when the chairman vacates office."
First CEOs after Amalgamation
The first CEOs appointed for Mazowe, Bindura and Chirumhanzu were from the amalgamating Rural Councils. Whilst educational qualifications were considered (in any case they were not better educated than their District Council counterparts), this study established through interviews with council staff that the decision on whom to appoint showed the dominant nature of the amalgamating Rural Councils and the appeasing nature of the amalgamating District Councils, having satisfied themselves that these candidates were relatively acceptable. All the first CEOs in the cases studied, except for Umzingwane and Makoni, were middle-aged males who had attended the Domboshawa Council Secretary Course in the early 1970s. Umzingwane 13 and Makoni appointed recent graduates who were rising in the organisation.
RDCs were keen to take on their own members of staff for continuity. In any case the councillors of the former Rural or District Councils wanted one of their own to safeguard their interests. Because of the many uncertainties at amalgamation, RDCs wanted to deal with the 'devil they knew'. Moreover, they could pay the new CEOs low salaries as they set their own salary scales.
Ten Years Later, What Happened to the CEO's?
Having identified the contentious nature of the recruitment process for the first CEOs in the fledgling RDCs, the research established the longevity of the CEOs in their respective RDCs ( 13 Many insults were traded when the DA, who was also the Acting CEO, tried to preside over the consideration of CEO applications when he had also applied. The young SEO cried foul and called for the DA to recuse himself and his office from the selection. The process was started afresh and the chairman handled the applications.
As reflected in the table above, three RDCs, Bindura, Makoni and Gwanda, 14 managed to retain the first CEOs. The Umzingwane CEO sought greener pastures and resigned after three years, whilst the first Mazowe CEO died in 1998.
In the latter part of 1997, the CEOs for Mutasa, Chirumhanzu and Gokwe South RDCs were embroiled in corruption scandals, with the collusion of their chairmen, which rocked their councils to the brink of collapse. The CEOs were fired and the respective chairmen sidelined. From the minutes analysed, the disciplinary cases for these CEOs created many fissures in the already fragile RDCs recovering from the post-partum amalgamation pains. These CEOs had strong connections with the political leadership, including some councillors, and an 'unholy alliance with the council chairmen'.
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The RDCs were sharply divided on proper disciplinary measures. For example, in Mutasa, after an adverse audit report in 1997 implicated the CEO and Treasurer, the RDC held a Finance Committee meeting to debate the issue. The Full Council then convened a special meeting (10 February 1998) to discuss the audit report and resolved that the CEO and Treasurer should continue working as normal. that it was often better to look at staff turnover in relation to industry averages.
From the individual profiles obtained from the RDCs, the fourteen Substantive CEOs (Column 1 in . The next Acting CEO served for a few months before he fell out of favour with some councillors and was implicated in a scandal involving a cattle sales register. 22 The next appointed Acting CEO served for a few months again before being implicated in a scam involving getting unauthorised fuel and money from a council for his own use and was subsequently involved in a road accident with a council vehicle on an unauthorised journey. The DA was appointed in 2000 to finalise the cases and pave the way for a new CEO.
23 20 This new substantive CEO was the same person who had been caught up in the previous political fiasco involving the dismissed chairman and had his appointment turned down. At the time of the fieldwork, I was told that the political gladiators had left the scene, whereby the chairman had been dismissed, the ego-bruised provincial governor had died and the PA had been promoted to another portfolio at Head office. Thus, no-one vetoed his appointment. 21 She had been with the council for more than ten years. 22 The register where impounded stray cattle were recorded was suspected to have been meddled with. 23 It is noteworthy that Gokwe South RDC administrative offices were closed by war veterans on 5 th February 2001. The war veterans alleged massive maladministration and corruption. A task force was set up and the DA continued to Act as CEO and another DA was seconded to be a commissioner to oversee the transfer of Gokwe Urban wards to town status. There were also cases of in-fighting between councillors, especially after a council employee who was suspended pending dismissal contested council elections and came back as a councillor to become the council chairman.
There was an equally shaky retention scheme for departmental heads (managerial employees) below the CEO level in the RDCs. Hayhurst (2004) In terms of CEO retention, the cases studied (excluding Makoni, Bindura and Gwanda RDCs) exhibited what Davidson and Pennink (2001) aptly described as 'negative capacity'. This is the unproductive absorption of energies and motivation of individuals, but ending up with little as tangible output.
Hayhurst (2004) argued that restructuring, mergers and organisational changes have all contributed to the erosion of staff loyalty. She advised that retention did not always have to be expensive because rewards could be non-financial, but also some staff turnover is inevitable and could in fact be healthy for the organisation, as new employees bring new skills and ideas with them. Low staff turnover could also contribute to a lack of promotion opportunities, a static workforce and a lack of innovative thinking as bureaucratic inertia sets in. Generally, public sector salaries in Zimbabwe were low and the RDC scenario was even worse. There was a very high staff turnover in all the RDCs, especially in professional job categories such as engineers and accounts personnel, who had very good chances of finding alternative employment. The volatile political environment had compounded staff turnover.
With trade unions becoming vocal, this was readily associated with the opposition party. The 'war veterans' and vigilantes of the ruling ZANU PF party would be handy to 'purge any malcontents'.
The work of McGregor (2002) and Hammar (2005) amply demonstrated this point. As a result, fear had reached alarming levels. Watson (2005) observed that the link between staff development, employee satisfaction and staff retention had been established for some time but that many organisations missed out by not treating the issue of staff retention strategically. Watson (2005) thus advised that the first step was the development of an employee retention strategy that identified the pinch points for the organisation, the areas where the organisation regularly suffers high staff turnover, the particular concerns and the problems of the targeted staff groups.
Conclusion
While RDC employees are not civil servants in terms of the Public Service Commission regulations, they may appropriately be called public servants as they serve in the public domain. Thus, the label of being a council employee has lesser prestige than a civil servant, though in essence, there is nothing qualitatively different between the two.
